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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
No. 19-2269 
_______________ 
ERIKA NATHALIE MEJIA FUENTES, 
   Petitioner 
v. 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
    Respondent 
_______________ 
On Petition for Review of a Decision of the 
United States Department of Justice 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(A206-315-011) 
Immigration Judge: Shifra Rubin 
_______________ 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
on January 30, 2020 
Before: CHAGARES, RESTREPO, and BIBAS, Circuit Judges 
(Filed: February 4, 2020) 
_______________ 
OPINION* 
_______________ 
  
                                              
*
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding 
precedent. 
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BIBAS, Circuit Judge.  
Erika Nathalie Mejia Fuentes, a native and citizen of El Salvador, seeks asylum, with-
holding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The immigra-
tion judge found her credible but denied all relief and ordered her removal. The Board of 
Immigration Appeals adopted that decision in full, so we review the immigration judge’s 
decision. Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 n.2 (3d Cir. 2001). The immigration judge 
had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 1240.1(a), and the Board had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.1(b)(3). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). 
To overturn the immigration judge’s dispositive findings of fact, “we must find that the 
evidence not only supports [a contrary] conclusion, but compels it.” INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 
502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1 (1992) (emphases in original); see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). But the 
immigration judge’s factual findings were supported by the record, and Mejia does not 
challenge several of the grounds for denying her claim. So we will deny her petition for 
review. 
Mejia seeks asylum and withholding of removal as a member of a particular social 
group: “Family members of MS-13,” a violent gang in El Salvador. Pet’r Br. 3. The immi-
gration judge found that her proposed group did not qualify as a “particular social group” 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) because it lacked particularity and social visibility. We 
need not review that finding, because the immigration judge also found (1) that Mejia did 
not show past persecution; (2) that any past harm was not because of her familial relation-
ship to a gang member; and (3) that while Mejia subjectively feared future harm, her fear 
was not objectively reasonable and was speculative. Each of these findings is supported by 
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the record, and Mejia cites no record evidence to the contrary. Collectively, these three 
findings dispose of her petition. 
First, any past harm did not amount to persecution. True, Mejia was robbed “about 
three” times by gang members. AR 147. And her cousin Sofia, a gang member, once 
walked by Mejia menacingly with a knife under her shirt. Mejia later heard that Sofia had 
wanted to stab her as she walked by, though she did not. The immigration judge reasonably 
found that these sporadic events did not clear the high bar of persecution. See Ambart-
soumian v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 85, 93 (3d Cir. 2004). In any event, Mejia cites no contrary 
evidence and does not challenge this finding. 
Second, any past harm was not because of Mejia’s familial relationship to a gang mem-
ber. She testified that the robbers targeted her because she was wearing a shirt that pro-
moted her perfume company, signaling that she had money. During her credible-fear inter-
view, she testified that “the only reason” for her cousin Sofia’s threats was Sofia’s “jeal-
ousy” of Mejia’s education, employment, and more privileged upbringing. AR 312–13. 
The immigration judge reasonably found that any targeting was “because of personal dis-
putes rather than [Mejia’s] membership in any particular social group.” AR 44. Mejia cites 
no contrary evidence and does not challenge this finding either. Indeed, in her brief before 
the Board, her lawyer conceded that Mejia’s “persecution may not have been ‘on account 
of’ her family relationship” with Sofia. AR 8. That is enough to deny her claims for asylum 
and withholding of removal. 
Third, Mejia’s sincere fear of future harm was not objectively reasonable. Her cousin 
intimidated her only once and has not tried to contact her for more than five years. And her 
 4 
parents still live safely in El Salvador; her cousin has not harmed them. The immigration 
judge reasonably found no well-founded fear of persecution. Any fear, the judge found, “is 
too speculative to merit protection.” AR 47. So it was not “more likely than not” that she 
would face future persecution, as the Convention requires. Amanfi v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 
719, 725 (3d Cir. 2003). Once again, Mejia cites no contrary evidence and does not chal-
lenge this finding. Thus, her Convention claim fails even if the authorities acquiesced in or 
turned a blind eye to gang violence, as she argues. So we will deny the petition for review. 
